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"We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we now
know that it is bad economics."I
-President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The financial crisis of 2008 gave rise to considerable debate regarding the
2
causes of the crisis and prevention of its future occurrence. . However,
affirmative assurance that such a financial crisis never happens again is highly
unlikely. Certainly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act does not purport to ensure a similar financial crisis never
happens again, despite rhetoric to the contrary, because it protects systemic
financial-service institutions that were at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis.
As long as systemic financial-service institutions exist, there is a strong
probability that another financial crisis will occur and that a taxpayer-financed
government-bailout will be necessary.4 Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act anticipates such an event.f
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, United States, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20,
1937), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/froos2.asp.
2. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 3-6, 9-13 (2010) (suggesting that deregulation caused by
Wall Street's influence in Washington is to blame for the 2008 financial crisis and criticizing the
government's proposed solutions as insufficient to prevent a future financial crisis); RICHARD A.
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM xii-xiii (2009) [hereinafter POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM] (posing questions about the cause, solution, and prevention of the 2008 financial
crisis); Adam J. Levition, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial
Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 999-1000 (2009) (predicting that the cause of the financial
crisis will be an underlying theme of the crisis's analysis now and in the future, and introducing
some of the emerging ideologies on the issue of cause); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout:
Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185-86 (2009) (describing the
beginnings of the 2008 financial crisis, identifying the debate regarding its cause, and introducing
a possible solution to preventing its reoccurrence in the future).
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (leaving in place existing
financial institutions, but requiring closer supervision of their risk as it relates to the overall
economy of the nation); see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 11-13 (suggesting that the 2008
financial crisis will happen again so long as the size and power of existing financial institutions
remain unaffected).
4. See JOHNSON AND KWAK, supra note 2, at 208-11 (summarizing arguments made by
accredited economists and commentators suggesting that breaking up big financial institutions
will be the best way to control the excessive risk-taking that led to the 2008 financial crisis).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1101, 1105, 124 Stat.
at 2113-15, 2121-25 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343, 5612).
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Though the Act protects the cause of the 2008 financial crisis, another
financial crisis can be mitigated through the application of antitrust law,
specifically § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act), an
anti-monopolization law.6 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopoly
power acquired or maintained through anticompetitive conduct.7 Accordingly,
the application of § 2 to a systemic financial-service institution will depend on
whether the institution has monopoly power and, if so, whether such power
was acquired or maintained through anticompetitive conduct.
This Article begins by examining the origins of § 2 of the Sherman Act and
its evolution, exploring its aim to meet the goals of modern, economic policy.
The passage of § 2 invoked a populist approach, which reflected the concern
that a concentration of private wealth is dangerous to democracy. Though this
remains a concern today regarding systemic financial-service institutions, the
populist approach was never fully embraced by the courts. Instead, the
economic-efficiency approach, which used antitrust law to address market
failure and to maintain and promote a free market system, became the
dominate doctrine.
Section II of this Article illustrates how systemic financial-service
institutions do not serve economic efficiency well and, indeed, exacerbate
market failure and encourage more government intervention through bailouts.
Accordingly, applying § 2 of the Sherman Act to systemic financial-service
institutions is not incompatible with either the populist or the
economic-efficiency approach.
Section III then discusses the application of § 2 liability to systemic
financial-service institutions as a solution to the recent, financial crisis and as a
means to prevent another crisis. Notably, this application has elicited little
discussion, likely due to the belief that any one systemic financial-service
institution does not have a sufficient market share to establish the monopoly
power necessary to implicate § 2 liability. However, the courts have never
limited monopoly power to a market-share analysis.9 This Article proposes
that monopoly power can be established by the negative externality that
systemic financial-service institutions can create. This negative externality is
an extorted government subsidy that is not available to nonsystemic
financial-service institutions, which results in an anticompetitive environment,
monopoly prices, and consumer harm. This Article concludes that such power
is acquired or maintained through anticompetitive conduct-specifically
deliberate acts aimed to obtain systemic status.
6. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
7. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2.
8. See infra notes 35-41.
9. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the
Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214, 1220 (discussing the inability of a
static market-structure analysis to respond to the modem changes in technology and industry, and
the courts' expanding consideration of such innovative factors).
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The recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act does not contain a specific antitrust immunity provision.' 0
Section IV addresses the possibility that, even if systemic financial-service
institutions have monopoly power and such power is acquired or maintained
through anticompetitive conduct, the courts nevertheless might find an implied
immunity because of the regulatory nature of the industry. This section goes
on to conclude that, although courts are reluctant to apply antitrust law to
regulated industries, recent experience with inadequate regulatory oversight
should prompt courts to reconsider this trend and apply antitrust law absent
Congressional direction otherwise.
Next, Section V discusses judicial hurdles associated with the application of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act to systemic financial-service institutions, including the
problems of quasi-implied immunity, cyclical government enforcement, a lack
of judicial understanding of the economic theories underlying antitrust law and
the financial-services sector, the expense of litigating antitrust cases, the
potential resultant social and economic burdens, and the potential side effects
created if systemic financial-service institutions are required to divest and
cannot compete with foreign, systemic financial-service institutions. But,
though applying § 2 to systemic financial-service institutions may create
substantial problems, the possible prevention of a future financial crisis
outweighs the potential consequences of applying § 2. In fact, a more radical
approach may be required to guarantee financial stability.
Finally, Section VI addresses some of the shortfalls of exclusively relying on
regulatory oversight and reform to resolve the problem of systemic
financial-service institutions, especially when reform does not work to
eliminate these institutions. Specifically, the recently passed regulatory reform
will possibly mitigate some of the negative effects of systemic financial-
service institutions if problems are caught in time. However, the regulation
fails to eliminate risks that may circumvent the preventative measures. This is
not to say that regulatory reform is undesirable, rather that it is merely a
limited remedy that should be augmented with antitrust law.
I. HISTORY OF THE POLICY OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
As long as there has been trade, there have been attempts to monopolize.
Laws relating to restraints on trade can be traced back to the ancient Roman
period." Competition laws pertaining to restraints on trade evolved into
10. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 6, 124 Stat. 1376, 1390-91 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5303) (providing that
the Act does not affect the operation of antitrust laws unless otherwise provided).
I1. See David J. Gerber, Prometheus Born: The High Middle Ages and the Relationship
Between Law and Economic Conduct, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 673, 722-23 (1994) (discussing the
introduction of penalties under Roman Law resulting from activity that unnaturally raised prices);
Lawrence A. Sullivan & Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 197, 199 (1998) (acknowledging a Roman "antitrust" law).
360 [Vol. 60:357
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middlemen laws and were known as forestalling, regrating, and engrossing.12
These laws primarily dealt with enhanced prices created by the use of
middlemen or tactics that reduced supply. Initially, laws addressing
monopolies were limited mostly to special grants or letters patent given by the
crown for the exclusive right to manufacture or sell a good. 14 Though the
middlemen laws in England were repealed in 1772, and common law aspects
were abolished in 1844,15 case law relating to restraints on trade continued to
develop.16 As such, the development of economic theories appertaining to
supply and demand emerged along with economic theories relating to
monopolies.
From this English common law, the United States developed its antitrust
law. The Congressional Record containing the debates leading to the passage
of the Sherman Act in 1890-the first antitrust act in the
United States-indicates a concern with restraints on trade similar to English
common law concerns.' 9 However, U.S. antitrust law also reflects the unique
social, political, and economic situation in the United States during the late
nineteenth century. 20
When Senator John Sherman first introduced the bill that declared trusts and
combinations in the restraint of trade unlawful on December 4, 1889, it did not
include single party offenses, known as Sherman Act § 2 monopolization
offenses.21 The original bill prohibited arrangements that tended to "prevent
full and free competition . . . and all arrangements . . . which tend to advance
12. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *158-59; PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS para. 128, at 32 (6th ed. 2004). Engrossing is to buy as much of a good as
possible with the intent to resell at a monopoly price. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 260
(2d ed. 1989). Forestalling is to buy up goods before they reach the public market with the intent
to raise prices. 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 62. Regrating is to buy up
commodities for later resale in the same or a nearby market area for a profit. 13 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 518-19.
13. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12.
14. Id
15. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 12.
16. See Nordenfelt v. Maxium Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition, [1894] A.C. 535 (H.L.) at
565 (Eng.) (discussing whether the agreement between the parties illegally restrained trade).
17. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 164 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books
1981) (1776) (describing monopolies and their distortion of supply and demand).
18. See 21 CONG. REC. 2456-59 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (recognizing that the
bill proposing to restrain trade "applies old and well recognized principles of common law");
Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact ofAntitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
415, 415 (1998) (acknowledging that the United States inherited antitrust law from Britain);
Sullivan and Fikentscher, supra note I1, at 199 (explaining how America developed its antitrust
law from English and Roman principles).
19. 21 Cong. Rec. 2456-59 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
20. See Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note I1, at 199 (explaining the evolution of American
industry, particularly with regard to competition and trade).
21. See ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 3-4 (1910) (analyzing the
original Sherman bill and noting its prohibitions).
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the cost to the consumer." 22 After introduction, the bill was referred to the
Senate Finance Committee, which developed a substitute bill that Senator
Sherman presented on March 21, 1890.23 Much of the debate regarding the
substitute bill revolved around Congress's constitutional power to legislate
24trade as supplied by the Interstate Commerce Clause. The legislative history
indicates that Senator Sherman did not intend to concentrate private economic
power in the hands of a few who could control prices and thereby harm
consumers; rather Senator Sherman meant to permit federal courts to hear
matters that affected interstate and international commerce on the same
common law basis as state courts,26 in part because he did not ascribe to the
economic argument that more efficient production reduced prices to
27
consumers.
Debate on the bill continued on March 27, 1890, again with a focus on the
constitutionality of the proposed legislation, and the matter was referred to the
Judiciary Committee.28 The Judiciary Committee reported back on April 8,
1890, with an amended bill that substantially became the current Sherman
Antitrust Act.29 This version of the bill did not include specific reference to
consumers and incorporated the unlawfulness of monopolization provision in
§ 2.30 Although considerable debate took place regarding this bill, most of it
centered on amendments relating to the damage provisions, which Congress
31
ultimately rejected. Prior to its final passage, however, an interesting
exchange took place between Senators George F. Edmunds and John Edward
Kenna regarding monopolization. Senator Kenna was concerned that deeming
monopolization unlawful would penalize one who, solely by "his own skill and
energy," obtained an innocent monopoly.32 Senator Edmunds responded that
such a result would not occur if the individual did not buy off his adversaries
or obtain possession of all of the goods in question.33 Senator Hoar took the
position that the bill's use of the term "monopoly" merely reflected an intent to
22. Id. at 3.
23. 21 CONG. REC. 2455 (1890) (statement of the Chief Clerk).
24. See id. at 2456-68.
25. Id at 2457 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
26. Id at 2456 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
27. Id at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman) ("It is sometimes said of these combinations
that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows
that this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer.").
28. See id. at 2723-31.
29. Compare Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006), with 21 CONG. REC. 3145
(1890) (statement of the Secretary).
30. See 21 CONG. REc. 3145 (1890) (statement of the Secretary) (reciting the updated bill
language).
31. See id. at 3145-51 (rejecting amendments proposed by Senators Eugene Reagan and
James Z. George).
32. Id. at 3151-52 (statement of Sen. Kenna).
33. Id.
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codify the common law's stance on restraint of trade, so as to make it equally
bad for one to restrain trade as it is for two or more entities to do so. 4
Ultimately, the Senate passed the bill on April 8, 1890, without further
amendment by a vote of fifty-two to one, with twenty absent.35
The House of Representatives considered the bill on May 1, 1890, where,
because of the international aspect of the bill, the debate focused on protective
tariffs and whether these were conducivg to the creation of trusts.36
Additionally, the record reveals public outrage over the concentration of
private wealth into the hands of a few. At that time, as now, there was great
public outcry regarding overreaching interest rates on mortgages and the price
of necessities, which indebted the common people and further concentrated
private wealth into the hands of a few.38
Many legal scholars and authorities support the populist position that United
States antitrust law was premised on political and social values, such as the
fear that the concentration of private wealth in the hands of a few is dangerous
to democracy. 39 This populist view of the purpose of antitrust law is also
34. Id. at 1352.
35. Id at 1353.
36. Id at 4092-98, 4102.
37. See id at 4102-03. For example, following is a poem that was read into the record that
day:
An' once there was a Senator who wouldn't mine the prayer
An' the interests of his people-he was a millionaire;
His office was a boughten one, with corporation wealth,
Of a set of legislators as dishonest as himself;
But just when he warn't lookin' the people got the scent
Of the dirt 'at he was playin', an' his underpinnin' went,
An' down he came kerwollop; they knowed what they's about,
An the Grangers 'ill get you too, ef you don't watch out.
Id. at 4103.
38. Id. at 4102-03.
39. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(contending that institutions that have accumulated a great concentration of economic power are
able to control the government); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (articulating the public's fear that harm could result
from the aggregation of capital by corporations in the late nineteenth century); Shirma
Baradaran-Robison et al., Religious Monopolies and the Commodification ofReligion, 32 PEPP.
L. REV. 885, 932-34 (2005) (contending that a major goal of the Sherman Act was to avoid harm
to democracy by decreasing the concentration of power in the hands of a few); Richard M.
Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much Is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 37-39 (2001)
(arguing that antitrust analysis is more than simply a consideration of economic factors); James
M. Fesmire, Maximum Vertical Price Fixing from Albrecht Through Brunswick to Kahn: An
Antitrust Odyssey, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 721, 742-43 (2001) ("[T]he purposes of antitrust law
include the prevention of excessive concentration of economic power and the tendency of such
concentrations to lead to undesirable government intrusion into the economy."); Eleanor M. Fox,
The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140, 1152-54 (1981)
(asserting that antitrust laws oppose private power and are not meant to further economic
efficiency); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
2011] 363
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supported by scholars of economic history and political science. 4 0 Indeed, the
political cartoons of the time certainly suggest a public sentiment that private
economic wealth was undermining the democratic process:
.As,_~
41
Additionally, some court opinions support the populist view by articulating
concerns regarding the concentration of wealth in the few.42
1051-53 (1979) ("It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws."); Maurice Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 951, 989-90 (2008) (noting various non-economic concerns both scholars and the
Supreme Court hold regarding concentrated wealth); Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1219-20 (stating
that the Sherman Act is the product of political and social concerns, as opposed to concerns over
economic efficiency); Justin R. Watkins, Always Low Prices, Always at a Cost: A Call to Arms
Against the Wal-Martization of America, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 267, 281-85 (2006)
(acknowledging the view held by some scholars that non-economic factors played a role in
Congress's passage of the Sherman Act).
40. See DONALD L. KEMMERER & C. CLYDE JONES, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
349-51 (1959) (discussing the creation of the Sherman Act and notable, subsequent events);
PETER D'A. JONES, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 199 (1969)
(noting that public sentiment against trusts was enhanced during President Roosevelt's
administration); Lester M. Salamon & John J. Siegfried, Economic Power and Political
Influence: The Impact ofIndustry Structure on Public Policy, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1026,
1038-39 (1977) (suggesting that antitrust policy is necessary to avoid concentration of both
economic and political power).
41. Joseph Keppler, The Bosses of the Senate, PUCK, Jan. 23, 1989.
42. See Nat'l Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 829 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Sherman Act resulted from populist legislation designed to respond
to concentrations of economic wealth); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536
(1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy."); MCI
Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1110 (7th Cir. 1983) (acknowledging
the populist origins of antitrust law); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428
(2d Cir. 1945) (noting that one of the goals of early antitrust legislation was to end the
aggregation of economic wealth and to aid helpless individuals).
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Despite historical evidence to the contrary, some argue that the sole policy
behind antitrust law is to increase economic efficiency.43 The
economic-efficiency argument stems from the Chicago School antitrust
analysis, which gained judicial recognition in the 1960s and, some would
argue, became a dominant theory in the 1970s and 1980s." The Chicago
School and post-Chicago School of economic theory do not represent the first
time economic theory played a role in the policy of antitrust law, however. For
example, in the first Supreme Court decision regarding the Sherman Act,
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., the Court was faced with the legality of a
sugar trust.45 Although the Court's decision ultimately focused on defining
interstate commerce and found that manufacturing monopolies did not involve
commerce, the Court indicated in dicta that economic considerations are
relevant to the issue of monopolization: "[i]n the view which we take of the
case, we need not discuss whether, . . . according to political economists,
aggregations of capital may reduce prices, therefore the objection to
concentration of power is relieved ....
Though it appears that economic considerations have always played a role in
antitrust law, it is fair to say that, given its evolution over the years,47 antitrust
law changes to reflect current political, social, and economic realities. 48
Accordingly, as the Chicago School and post-Chicago School theory of
economic efficiency gained political and social prominence, some antitrust
scholars advocated the mathematical certainty of economic efficiency as a
means to achieve legal certainty.49 Unfortunately, the mathematical certainty
43. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1, at 4 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that the general
goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare through competition and efficiency);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 79 (1978) (arguing that economic efficiency
provides a means by which to determine consumer welfare); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW] (stating that
the justification for antitrust enforcement hinges upon what will yield the most efficient result);
Stucke, supra note 39, at 964 (promoting efficiency as the goal of competition and antitrust
enforcement).
44. Watkins, supra note 39, at 282.
45. 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895).
46. Id. at 10.
47. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 56-71 (3d ed.) (2005) (providing an overview of the history of antitrust law in
the United States).
48. See Sullivan & Fikentscher, supra note I1, at 197 ("[Tjhe meaning of the term antitrust
changes depending on various factors: the nation, the time period, the state of technology, the
capacity and social demands on business, the overall business culture, the currently accepted
economic theories, as well as the overall national concerns and values.").
49. See Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 409-12
(1965) (discussing theories that take a "business" type approach to antitrust law); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Power After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 233-34 (1985) (stating that
when given certain assumptions, the economic-efficiency model can identify certain efficiency
circumstances).
2011] 365
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of modem economic theory, as reflected in national economic policy, has
recently P(roven unreliable because humans do not act with mathematical
certainty. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has never fully abandoned a more
holistic approach to the problem of antitrust law.si In fact, in Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan, the Court held:
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses
from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the
failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of
solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public
interest.52
The financial crisis of 2008 was the result of a market failure. 53  The
question facing Americans today-and the question this Article addresses-is
whether antitrust law may be utilized to correct some of the problems that
caused the financial crisis of 2008.
Certainly, some of the initial goals of antitrust law were intended to address
the problem of a concentration of private economic power, though the problem
still exists today.54 But, history also suggests that preserving the free market is
an important goal of antitrust law, and, in fact, it has played a critical role in
the development of antitrust law.55 The reason for this dichotomy of antitrust
theory is simple: the two goals are not mutually exclusive. Both the populist
view that the concentration of private economic power undermines the
democratic process56 as well as free-market economic theory raise concerns
about the propriety of government intervention.57 In the 2008 financial crisis,
the government intervened to rescue systemic financial-service institutions.
The populist perspective would likely posit that this government intervention
came at the request of systemic financial-service institutions and was granted
50. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at 83.
51. HOVENKAMP, supra note 47, at 56-67, 69 (describing the trend of the Court's decisions
regarding the Sherman Act and asserting that the Court has yet to say that economic efficiency is
the main concern of antitrust law).
52. 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
53. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at xii, 49.
54. See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 189-222 (arguing that large financial
institutions caused the recent financial crisis and that these entities must be broken up to prevent
future crises).
55. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, para. 12c2, at 131-32 (acknowledging the
prominent role of low-cost production, "efficient resource allocation, and progressiveness" in
antitrust policy).
56. See id. para. 100b, at 6 (discussing that populists tend to believe that competition will
"solve all manner of economic and social problems").
57. BORK, supra note 43, at 412-13 (articulating the limited government-intervention
approach favored by economic theorists).
58. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 1-5.
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on generous terms due to their political power.59  Alternatively,
under the free-market economic theory, a firm that took unreasonable
risks should fail, not receive a government bailout.60  As the Supreme
Court pointed out in Spectrum, antitrust law is aimed at protecting
the public from the failure of the market.61  Systemic financial-service
institutions that have a propensity for creating market failure harm the
public 62  and violate both the populist and economic efficiency
theories of antitrust law. 63
II. THE INEFFICIENCIES OF SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL-SERVICE INSTITUTIONS
Systemic financial failure is a domino effect64 because an institution,
market, or instrument can cause widespread distress in the financial
system or overall economy.65 In this regard, systemic financial
59. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al (acknowledging the effect that fear of economic
collapse has on the political arena); Simon Johnson, Antitrust for Banks? Ask Carl Shapiro,
WALL STREET PIT (May 12, 2009, 8:18 PM), http://wallstreetpit.com/4272-antitrust-for-banks-
ask-carl-shapiro (discussing the fact that banks engage in certain risky behavior because they
understand that they wield strong political power).
60. See Lawrence H. Summers, Rebuilding a Healthy Financial System, Remarks at the
Georgetown University Future of Finance Conference (Sept. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/speeches/rebuilding-a-healthy-financial-
system (explaining how, in a free-market system, explicit or implicit guarantees of government
intervention in the case of failure encourage larger financial institutions to take more risks).
61. 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
62. Allison M. Hashmall, Note, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate "Too Big to
Fail" Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 833 (2010) ("Systemic risk can
also harm the economy primarily by raising the cost of capital .... ).
63. Compare AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, at 3-4 (providing examples of
populist goals), with POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 43, at 8 (explaining why monopolies
reduce economic efficiency in many circumstances).
64. See Oliver de Bandt & Phillip Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey 10 (European Cent.
Bank, Working Paper No. 35, 2000) (explaining how the narrow definition of a "systemic event"
can, through the failure of a financial institution, result in a "sequential fashion of considerable
adverse effects," known as a domino effect); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193, 198 (2008) (defining a "domino effect" as "a chain of bad economic consequences").
Although systemic financial markets or systemic financial instruments can also cause systemic
financial failure, this Article focuses on the elimination of systemic financial-service institutions,
which arguably can cause systemic financial failure. Though regulation of systemic
financial-service institutions cannot guarantee economic stability, the elimination of systemic
financial-service institutions reduces the probability of systemic financial failure caused by
systemic financial instruments through reducing the holdings of systemic financial instruments
and markets, and thus allowing the principles of a free market to eliminate weak players.
65. See MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. DEP'T, INT'L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY &
ECoN. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETILEMENTS & THE SECRETARIAT OF FIN. STABILITY BD.,
GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND
INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (2009) [hereinafter IMF's INITIAL
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failure market failure is market failure. 6 6
Several different market-intervention methods have been utilized to address
systemic financial failure caused by systemic financial-service institutions. A
"bailout," through which the government funnels public funds into a systemic
financial-service institution, is one method used to rescue the economy from
systemic financial failure.67 Another method used is merger, where the
68
government finds a relatively healthy institution to take over the weaker one.
Although in the short term such methods may soften the consequences of a
systemic financial failure, the long-term effects have a high-cost impact on
competition in a free market in at least three ways. First, bailouts skew
competitive markets by injecting government aid into systemic
financial-service institutions, but not into nonsystemic financial-service
institution competitors.69 This not only creates the moral hazard of rewarding
bad judgment, but it also amounts to a subsidy and creates an unfair advantage
by providing the systemic financial-service institution with publicly funded
insurance against failure.70 Second, the merger method consolidates systemic
CONSIDERATIONS] ("G-20 members consider an institution, market or instrument as systemic if
its failure or malfunction causes widespread distress, either as a direct impact or as a trigger for
broader contagion."); Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 198 (identifying ways in which the domino
effect can cause significant consequences to financial intuitions and financial market prices).
66. See INGO FENDER & JACOB GYNTELBERG, BANKS FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, BIS
QUARTERLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
1-12 (Sept. 2008) (indicating how higher financial sector losses coincided with the struggling
credit and housing markets); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Current Economic
and Financial Conditions, Speech at the National Association for Business Economics 50th
Annual Meeting (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20081007a.htm (providing examples of how the systemic risk associated with large
companies threatens financial stability to the point where there is justification for the government
to intervene in order to protect the public interest and mitigate market failure).
67. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Policy Bailout, 67
IND. L.J. 951, 955 (1992) ("Bailout is a form of government intervention in another market arena,
in most cases, a private market."); see, e.g., Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Teddy Showed the
Banks Who's Boss. Will Obama?, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2010, at B3 (discussing the government
bailouts of 2009 and the early twentieth century).
68. See FABIA PANETTA ET AL., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, AN ASSESSMENT OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR RESCUE PROGRAMMES 10-19 (2009) (demonstrating how the government
took on the loss of a bank and essentially merged assets to promote stability).
69. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISK 38, 40 tbl.1.5 (2009), available at
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf (explaining policies used to address
failing banks and concurring effectiveness of each policy).
70. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 171-72 (exploring how, through stress tests,
reduced competition, and lower interest rates, the government helped banks increase profits and
created a government lifeline that gave banks the time to recapitalize themselves); Okamoto,
supra note 2, at 204-05 (categorizing banks that are too big to fail as falling within "asset
manager relationships" where an actor does not bear the full cost of the risk, making it easy to
take on additional risk to earn returns); Johnson & Kwak, supra note 67 (discussing unfair
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financial-service institutions, which exacerbates the consequence of any failure
of the remaining systemic financial-service institutions.7' Finally, these
methods undermine the basic tenets of free-market theory because the
government saves an institution the market deemed unfit.72
III. SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL SERVICE-INSTITUTIONS AND § 2 OF THE SHERMAN
ACT
Though financial-reform laws and regulation have not addressed the
possibility of eliminating systemic financial-service institutions through
antitrust law, international financial reform has raised the possibility of
mitigating the situation through merger review. For example, the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union recognizes that state aid may distort free
markets by creating an unfair trade advantage.73 Although the treaty provided
74for extraordinary measures to address the financial crisis in 2009, such as
mergers between large financial-services institutions and state aid (bailout
money), the European Union's Competition Commission will require some
divestiture of these institutions once the financial markets have stabilized.
However, these measures are responsive and do not reflect a policy to
competition and noting that the "huge financial firms" that have "get out ofjail free card[s] distort
the free market").
71. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Implications of the Financial
Meltdown for the FTC, Remarks at the New York Bar Association Annual Dinner 7-9 (Jan. 29,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091029financialcrisisnybarspeech.pdf
("[1]f a merger creates a firm whose failure is likely to have a catastrophic effect on the market as
a whole, because it is so integral to the market, the end result may be a substantial lessening of
competition.").
72. See Pitofsky, supra note 39, at 1056 (discussing the preference for a "free market
system"); David Shay Corbett II, Book Note, Free Markets and Government Regulation: The
Competing Views of Thomas Woods and George Cooper, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 547, 547-49
(2010) (discussing how the free-market economy is essentially a market environment left
untouched by the government or another powerful economic force and noting that, though a
free-market economy naturally finds equilibrium, government regulation upsets the equilibrium).
73. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107,§§ 1, 3(c), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 1, 91-92.
74. Id. art. 107, § 2(b) (providing that "aid to make good the damage caused by natural
disasters or exceptional occurrences" is compatible with the internal market).
75. Neelie Kroes, European Comm'r for Competition Policy, Commission Outlines
Conditions for State Aid to KBC, ING and Lloyds, Opening Remarks at Press Conference (Nov.
18, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/5
41&format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (follow "PDF" hyperlink); Foo
Yun Chee, New EU Bank Rules Will Limit Acquisitions, REUTERS (Jul. 23, 2009),
http//www.uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKTRE56M23620090723; Clara Ferreira-Marques &
Steve Slater, Lloyds, RBS Agree to Massive Shake-up, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE5A206F20091103; Myless Neligan & Raji
Menon, Update I-Lloyds Tests Waters on Cash Call, Deal Seen Soon, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKLU71701820091030.
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eliminate, or prevent the formation of, systemic financial-service institutions
before they require state aid.76
In the United States, there has been a slow, but growing, recognition of the
prudence of addressing the problem of systemic institutions through antitrust
law.77 J. Thomas Rosch, a Commissioner for the Federal Trade
Commission-one of the U.S. federal agencies charged with antitrust
enforcement-indicated the possibility of addressing systemic
financial-service institutions through domestic antitrust law.78 This suggestion
initially received criticism,79 but it has garnered support over time, at least with
respect to addressing systemic financial-service institutions through merger
law and regulatory reform.80
The critical question is: will current antitrust law, in particular § 2 of the
Sherman Act, work? Theoretically, the answer is "yes," if the courts properly
define a systemic financial-service institution and apply case precedent
defining monopolization. But this would require the courts to recognize the
economic reality that market share alone is insufficient to determine monopoly
power in the case of systemic financial-service institutions.
A. Defining Systemic Financial-Service Institutions
The Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international financial organization
consisting of "[n]ational and regional authorities responsible for maintaining
financial responsibility . . .; [i]nternational financial institutions; . . . and
[i]ntemational standard setting, regulatory, supervisory and central bank
bodies,"81 along with the International Monetary Fund and Bank for
International Settlements, has identified three key characteristics of systemic
institutions that provide a good starting point for defining the entities. These
are:
76. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 69, at xxiii (discussing how "new regulatory
approaches are needed to avoid the buildup of systemic risk" and prevent the reaction of systemic
financial-institution leverage).
77. See, e.g., Rosch, supra note 71, at 2, 7-9, 13 (suggesting that applying antitrust
enforcement to mergers, single-firm conduct, and cartels will help solve the economic crisis).
7 8. Id.
79. See id. at 5-6, 8-9.
80. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra, note 2, at 13, 220-21 (discussing how the nature of
private businesses has changed over the years and how antitrust law and politics can contribute to
the prevention of the formation of "too big to fail" institutions); Damien Paletta & Jonathan
Weisman, Proposal Set to Curb Bank Giants, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2010, at A2 (addressing
President Barack Obama's proposal to restrict the country's largest financial institutions in order
to prevent large-scale economic rule as well as to preclude these institutions from distorting
"normal competitive forces").
81. Financial Stability Board Charter arts. 1, 4, available at http://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r_090925d.pdf.
82. IMF's INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 65, at 9.
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1. Size. The determination of size takes into account on- and
off-balance-sheet items, the institution's assets, transactions, and general risk
exposure.83 These characteristics are then analyzed with regard to the business
model used and the complexity of the institution itself.84 A systemic
institution's potential for problems in the case of failure is often connected to
the size of activity in a market.85
2. "Lack of substitutability. " Generally, certain types of infrastructure-like
services provided by a systemic institution to other institutions are of systemic
importance.86 When an institution provides a voluminous amount of services,
the fact that these institutions have no adequate substitutes is of great
concern.
3. Interconnectedness. This refers to the aforementioned domino effect, in
which a systemic institution's potential failure will have immediate and
sizeable effects on a large number of other significant institutions. This is
also known as counterparty risk.
Additionally, the FSB identifies a number of important considerations that
supplement these three criteria.90 One of these is leverage.9 Leverage
involves the interaction of relatively illiquid, risky assets and large amounts of
short-term funding, all of which creates great potential for disruptive failures.9 2
It is often understood as a ratio of debt to equity.93 Together, these criteria and
characteristics give rise to an analysis of systemic significance. 94 The FSB
posits that "[t]he ideal model-derived measure of systemic impact would be
built on the basis of a macroeconomic model that includes a developed
financial sector to capture the macro-financial linkages, but also a description
of the network of links between financial institutions and markets." 95 With
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id at 10.
86. Id. at 9-10.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 9-10.
89. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REv. 167, 206 (2011) (noting that "[c]ounterparty risk refers to the
counterparty's ability to satisfy its obligations under a credit default swap agreement" and
discussing the risk involved if a counterparty cannot fulfill its obligations).
90. IMF's INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 65, at 11, 13.
9 1. Id.
92. See id at 13, 25 tbl.l.
93. Sonya Andreassen Henderson & Michael LoGiudice, Balance Sheet and Income
Statement Basics, 1823 PRAC. L. INST. 145, 163 (2010) ("The debt-to-equity ratio measures the
leverage of the company.").
94. IMF's INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 65, at 15 ("The framework discussed ...
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this, the FSB has identified four concepts that are helpful in analyzing specific
systemic financial institutions: size, interconnectedness, leverage, and systemic
significance.9 6
The FSB criteria relating to a systemic financial institution were derived
from a survey of central bankers and represent a general consensus regarding
key characteristics of a systemic institution.97  Additionally, these
characteristics correspond with what most commentators have stated regarding
systemic institutions.98  Finally, the FSB characteristics are the same
characteristics articulated in financial regulatory reform in the United States. 99
By applying the FSB model to situations in the past where the United States
determined that a financial-services institution was systemic and warranted
government intervention, we can determine the relative systemic risk of a
financial institution.
1. An Example from the Past: Continental Illinois
A famous example of a systemic financial-institution is Continental Illinois
National Bank (Continental). 0oo In 1984, fearing the failure of the
seventh-largest bank in the United States, regulators bought Continental's bad
debt, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) fully protected all
of Continental's depositors despite the limits on deposit insurance.10
Applying the characteristics of a systemic institution to Continental at the time
of the crisis reveals the following:
96. See supra text accompanying notes 81-95.
97. IMF's INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 65, at 2, 4.
98. See Okamoto, supra note 2, at 194 (discussing Schwarcz's definition of "systemic
risk"); Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 198-200 (noting the domino effect that often results from the
failure of institutions and discussing, in particular, the connectedness of financial institutions and
the resultant potential for failure).
99. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 404(b)(3), 804(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1572, 1807 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5463(a)(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)).
100. Cybil White, Riegle-Neal 's 10% Nationwide Deposit Cap: Arbitrary and Unnecessary,
9 N.C. BANKING INST. 374, 354 (2005).
101. Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corporation and Continental Illinois National Bank:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation and Ins. of the H. Comm.
on Banking, Fin, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 175, 348 (1984) (statement of C. Todd Conover)
(noting that the FDIC owned eighty percent of the shares of the bank); Kenneth A. Guenther, The
Outlook for Specialized Institutions in the World of the Too Big to Fail, 8 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
467, 470 (1989) (noting, in the context of the Continental failure, that banks that are "too big to
be allowed to fail" are fully protected); White, supra note 100, at 354-55 ("[T]he [FDIC]
disregarded the limit on deposit insurance coverage and fully protected all Continental creditors."
(citation omitted)); I FDIC, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND
EARLY 1990s, 243-44 (1997), available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
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1. Size. Continental had approximately $40 billion in total assets in 1983.102
All U.S. banks had $2.05 trillion in total assets in 1983.103
2. Interconnectedness. A total of 2,300 banks invested in Continental.104
Sixty-six of those banks, with total assets of $5 billion, "had more than 100
percent of their equity capital invested in Continental."',
0 5
3. Leverage. 20:1.106
4. Systemic Significance. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1983 was
$3.5 trillion 0 7  Using the formula that assets + (assets x leverage)
+ interconnectedness = potential exposure, the calculation works out as
follows:
$40,000,000,000 + ($40,000,000,000 x 20) + $5,000,000,000
= $845,000,000,000. The U.S. economy may be calculated by looking at
banking assets plus GDP-$2,049,018,000,000 + $3,500,000,000,000
= $5,549,018,000,000. Accordingly, the exposure of funds resulting from
Continental's financial structure was 24.1% of GDP and 15.2% of GDP
combined with U.S. banking assets.
2. Example from the Past: Long-Term Capital Management
In 1998, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was
about to fail. os Again, the government intervened, fearing a systemic event.109
The same characteristics as applied to LTCM demonstrate the following:
1. Size. LTCM had $126 billion in total assets in 1998.110 All U.S. banks
had $5,283,300,000,000 in assets in 1998."'
2. Interconnectedness. At least $3 billion. 112
102. 1 FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 546 (1997),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history2-04.pdf.
103. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., ANNUAL STATISTICAL DIGEST: 1983
208 (1983), available at http://fraser/stlouisfed.org/publications/astatdig/issue/1 12/down
load/958/part2.pdf.
104. Continental-Illinois, UNIV. OF CHI., http://picker.uchicago.edu/bailouts/CINB.ppt#287,
34,MorahHazard (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
105. Id.
106. What is the Size of the Problem?, DINOCRAT.COM (Mar. 5, 2008),
http://www.dinocrat.com/archives/2008/03/15/what-is-the-size-of-the-problem-2/.
107. Economic Statistics, NATIONMASTER.COM, http://nationmaster.com/graph/eco gdp-
economy-gdp&date= 1983 (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
108. BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKS' INTERACTIONS WITH HIGHLY
LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS 10 (1999), available at http://bis.org/publ/bcbs45.pdf
109. Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund
Industry: Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BuS. 359, 369
(2009).
110. Mardi Dungey et al., International Contagion Effects from the Russian Crisis and the
LTCM Near Collapse 6-7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/74, 2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0274.pdf.
11l. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL DIGEST: 1996-2000 51,
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/astatdig/issue/1 12/download/855/partl.pdf.
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3. Leverage. 55:1.113
4. Systemic Significance. The GDP in 1998 was $8,694,600,000,000.1 14
When applying the formula above, assets + (assets x leverage)
+ interconnectedness = potential exposure, the following results:
$126,000,000,000 + ($126,000,000,000 x 55) + $3,000,000,000
= $7,059,000,000,000. In 1998, the U.S. economy-banking assets plus
GDP-was $13,977,900,000,000 ($5,283,300,000,000 + $8,694,600,000,000).
Accordingly, exposure was 81% of GDP and 50.5% of GDP combined with
U.S. banking assets.
Based upon these two examples, when the sum of a financial institution's
assets, leverage, and interconnectedness reaches around 15.2% of GDP plus
U.S. banking assets, the U.S. government will intervene. This intervention is
usually in the form of a capital infusion and a guarantee to the institution's
creditors that they will be made whole at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.115
B. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
Once it has been determined that a financial-service institution is systemic,
the next question is whether it violates § 2 of the Sherman Act. As indicated
above, a systemic financial-service institution runs afoul of general antitrust
principles, such as those reflected by the populist and economic-efficiency
theories." But, is it possible that a single systemic financial-service
institution can monopolize trade or commerce in violation of § 2? Based on
the foregoing analysis, the answer is yes.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part: "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ... .1 The verb "monopolize," as used in § 2, means to
improperly obtain a dominant position in the market so as to exclude actual or
potential competition." And, a federal judge stated that "[a] practice short of
complete monopoly but which tends to create a monopoly and to deprive the
112. BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 108, at 13. "[M]ajor
counterparties developed rough estimates of the possible additional losses associated with their
direct exposures," and these estimates ranged from $3 to $5 billion. Id.
113. Dungey et al., supra note I10, at 6.
114. Economic Statistics, supra note 107.
115. See Helen Kennedy, Taxpayers to Rescue in $20 Billion Citigroup Bailout, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 23, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2008/11/23/2008-2008-11-
23_taxpayers to rescuein_20_billion citigr.html (explaining the process for a government
bailout of Citigroup).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
117. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
118. Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. Nat'1 Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 907 (D. Mass.
1954).
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public of the advantages from free competition in interstate trade offends the
policy of the Sherman Act."I 19
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a monopoly under § 2 is established if
there is "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident."1 20
1. Monopoly Power
The first prong of § 2 of the Sherman Act test is "monopoly power," 21
which the Supreme Court defined as "the power to control prices or exclude
competition." 22 Traditionally, courts have relied upon empirical evidence of
monopoly power, or, in the absence of empirical evidence, they have
conducted a market-share analysis to determine if a monopoly exists.123
Market share is determined by ascertaining the percent control of a product
(product market) within a specified geographic area (geographic market). 124
the market share reaches a certain level, courts will infer market power
(monopoly 1 ower),125 which is the power to control prices or exclude
competition. 26 Additionally, courts have required significant entry barriers to
prevent new competition from entering the market.127
Despite this, courts have not held the market-share analysis to be the
exclusive method for determining monopoly power.128 Indeed, the economic
119. Ala. Sportservice, Inc. v. Nat'l Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 767 F.
Supp. 1573, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
120. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
121. Id at 570.
122. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (emphasis
added).
123. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d. Cir. 2007).
124. HOVENKAMP, supra note 47, at 83.
125. "Monopoly power" and "market power" are terms that appear to be used
interchangeably by courts and commentators. See id. at 272-73 (using the terms "monopoly
power" and "market power" interchangeably).
126. Id.
127. Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 307. The Third Circuit explained:
To support an inference of monopoly power, a plaintiff typically must plead and
prove that a firm has a dominant share in a relevant market, and that significant "entry
barriers" protect that market. Barriers to entry are factors, such as regulatory
requirements, high capital costs, or technological obstacles, that prevent new
competition from entering a market in response to a monopolist's supracompetitive
prices.
Id (internal citations omitted); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986) ("[W]ithout barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to
maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.").
128. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1220.
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theory, which influences courts regarding antitrust analysis, 129 recognizes that
a pure market-share analysis is misleading.1 30  For example, a pure
market-share analysis inaccurately assumes a Pareto-optimal market,' 31 and it
ignores the effects of externalities.132 That said, applying a market-share
analysis would seem to indicate that a systemic financial-service institution
with less than thirty-three percent market share has little chance to be found as
133possessing monopoly power.
a. Market Share and Monopoly Power
The market-share analysis provides a relatively simple test that can be
understood and applied in the litigation context. But, to apply a market-share
analysis, the court must first define the product market. This seemingly simple
question turns out to be extremely complicated.
i. Product Market
Under a market-share analysis, a broadly defined product market will result
in a lower market share than a narrowly defined one. For example, a firm may
have only fifteen percent of the shoe market, but have seventy-five percent of
the work-boot market. Such a firm would probably have the ability to control
prices or eliminate competitors in the work-boot market, but not the overall
shoe market.
To a large extent, the product market depends upon the elasticity of the
demand curve.134 A product is elastic when consumers turn to a substitute
when an original product's price increases.135 Thus, a firm with a high market
share in an elastic market may have less market power than a firm with less
129. Id at 1220-21.
130. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 937, 947 (1981).
13 1. William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and Static
Inefficiencies?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 82, 83 (Thomas M. Jorde
& David J. Teece eds., 1992).
132. See Landes & Posner, supra note 130, at 947 (explaining that "influence of market
demand and supply elasticity on market power" should be considered under a market-share
analysis); Richard S. Markovits, The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the Sherman
Act: A Critique of the Statutes Themselves, Their Interpretation, and Their Operationalization, 38
BUFF. L. REv. 673, 743-44 (1990) (asserting that a market-share approach reflects neither the
company's theoretical nor actual monopoly power in a given market).
133. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d. Cir. 1945) (doubting
whether a sixty or sixty-four percent share of the market is enough to constitute a monopoly, and
asserting that "certainly thirty-three per cent is not"); Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and
the Virtues ofa Virtual Network, 43 INT'L L. 151, 170 (2009) (explaining that "substantial market
power" indicates an abuse of economic power).
134. See Landes & Posner, supra note 130, at 938-41 (explaining that the elasticity of
demand has a significant impact on a firm's market power).
135. Id. at 945.
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market share in an inelastic market. 136  Accordingly, in a Sherman Act
analysis, a court may ask, for example, if a customer seeking a work boot
would substitute it for a different type of shoe. To the extent the answer is
"yes," the product market would be elastic. Although courts certainly take
elasticity into consideration,' their ability to correctly define the product
market, including what properly constitutes a substitute, has been
questioned. 138
The product market for financial services has fluctuated over time. Initially,
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 had the effect of separating investment banking
and commercial banking. 139  Given this distinction, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, defined "product market" for
commercial banking as "various kinds of credit . . . and services."l 40
136. See id. at 947-48. Other situations affecting the elasticity of a demand curve include
when competitors do not operate at capacity so they can increase output and when the industry is
not costly to enter. Id. at 949-5 1.
137. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956)
(noting that, although the defendant may have monopolized the cellophane business, other types
of plastic wrapping provided competition and interchangeability).
138. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS: IN A NUTSHELL
188-222 (5th ed. 2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court's analysis in El. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. is incorrect because high cross-elasticity indicates low market power only when competitors
offer comparable prices for the same product); POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 43, at
127-28 (explaining that the E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. market-share analysis erroneously
ignored substitution in production and failed to specify the price for which products in a given
market could be considered interchangeable). See generally Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy
and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956) (describing E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. and arguing that the alleged monopolist should carry the burden of proving that competitors
in the market offer equally comparable products).
139. Sarah A. Wagman, Laws Separating Commercial Banking Security Activities as an
Impediment to Free Trade in Financial Services: A Comparative Study of Competitiveness in the
International Market for Financial Services, 15 MICH. L. REV. 999, 1006 (1994) ("The effect of
the Glass-Steagall Act is to impose a basic separation between commercial and investment
banking.").
An "investment bank" is defined as
an individual or institution which acts as an underwriter or agent for corporations
and municipalities issuing securities. Most also maintain broker/dealer operations,
maintain markets for previously issued securities, and offer advisory services to
investors. Investment banks also have a large role in facilitating mergers and
acquisitions, private equity placements and corporate restructuring.
Investment Bank, INVESTORWORDS.COM, http://investorwords.com/2602/investment-bank.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
Prior to legislative deregulation, commercial banking included: "acceptance of demand
deposits from individuals, corporations, governmental agencies, and other banks; acceptance of
time and savings deposits; estate and trust planning and trusteeship services; lock boxes and
safety-deposit boxes; account reconciliation services; foreign department services (acceptances
and letters of credit); correspondent services; investment advice." United States v. Phila. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326 n.5 (1962).
140. Phila. Nat '1 Bank, 374 U.S. at 356. The last Supreme Court case to apply this definition
was United States v. Connecticut National Bank, in which the Court held that commercial
Catholic University Law Review
In the nearly five decades since the Court's Philadelphia National Bank
decision, the product market has changed significantly because of the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.141 As a result, banks are currently allowed to
conduct both commercial banking and investment banking. 42 This suggests a
more elastic product market because customers are no longer limited to
commercial banks for some services and investment banks for others. Despite
this major development, the Philadelphia National Bank product-market
definition of 1963 remains unchanged. However, the Philadelphia National
Bank rule allows for adjustments to reflect trade realities. The Court stated, in
pertinent part, "[i]n sum, it is clear that commercial banking is a market
'sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities."' 1 43  if
economic reality is applied to the essence of the Philadelphia Bank rule, it
becomes evident that the cluster of products and services offered solely by the
commercial banks in 1963 are offered by a variety of financial-service
institutions today.144 Accordingly, the product market should be singly defined
for purposes of financial-service institutions, and should no longer be divided
between commercial and investments banks.
This economic-reality approach would seem to broaden the product market
and reduce market share as well as the ability to establish monopoly power.
However, the functional interchangeability of these financial-service
institutions suggests otherwise, that a more elastic product market does not end
the problem. As the court found in FTC v. Staples, submarkets may exist
within the broader product market for purposes of product-market definition
and, hence, monopoly power.145 The application of a submarket analysis
narrows the product-market definition and increases market share. Indicia
used by the courts to determine -if a submarket exists include: "industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
banking is the product market for savings banks, not a separate product market. 418 U.S. 656,
666 (1974).
141. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
142. See id. (repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, which had effectively prohibited affiliations
between investment and commercial banks).
143. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357 (quoting Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d
800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961)).
144. See ARTHUR F. BURNS, THE ONGOING REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BANKING 4-5, 11
(1988) (noting the restrictions placed on banks and financial institutions regarding "the kinds of
services each could offer" and discussing the effect of the emergence of higher interest rates);
Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank
Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 623 (1999) (exploring how
the disintermediation of banks in the 1960s prompted many commercial-loan customers to switch
from banks to the commercial-paper market).
145. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997).
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vendors."l 46 The court in Staples noted that these were "practical indicia,"
thereby permitting a finding that a submarket exists in situations where some,
but not all, of the indicia are present.147 For example, in Staples, where the
focus was on sensitivity to price change, the court noted that office-supply
superstores, such as Staples, Office Depot, or OfficeMax, only viewed each
other as competitors in consumable office supplies and did not consider other
non-office supply superstores, such as WalMart.148
Applying the Staples indicia, it is apparent that systemic financial-service
institutions constitute a submarket. This denotation has the effect of increasing
market share by narrowly defining the product market as a submarket. This is
accomplished by first considering the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act's treatment of systemic financial companies as
separate economic entities that have separate prudential requirements, capital
requirements, and methods to wind-down a failed systemic financial-service
institution.149 Second, the large size of systemic financial-service institutions
permits them to carry out large, complex business transactions for their distinct
customers.o50  Third, systemic financial-service institutions charge higher
interest rates for loans and higher fees to customers, while paying lower
interest rates to customers on consumer saving and checking accounts than do
nonsystemic financial-service institutions.i15 Finally, systemic
financial-service institutions raise fees with little-to-no regard for the business
actions of nonsystemic financial-service institutions.152 All these factors
suggest a submarket in financial services offered by systemic financial-service
institutions.
Of course, there has been much criticism of the submarket analysis,
specifically contending that it pays insufficient attention to the relevant
market's ability to charge monopoly prices.153 Indeed, these critics present a
compelling argument to the extent that the submarket theory does not reflect
146. Id (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).
147. Id
148. Id. at 1075-78.
149. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203,
§§ 165, 203-204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423-32, 1450-56 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365,
5383-5384).
150. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 219.
151. Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost Benefit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, and Consumer
Benefits: A Study ofthe Financial Services Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 321, 339, 344 (2003) (asserting that large financial institutions are not more efficient, do
not offer consumer benefits, and in fact, charge higher fees for customers than smaller
financial-service companies); David Cho, Banks "Too Big to Fail" Have Grown Even Bigger,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009, at Al9 (discussing the concern of consumers regarding the bailout
and the bailout's effect on the financial industry, noting that they see fewer choices and higher
costs with regard to financial services).
152. Cho, supra note 151, at Al9.
153. IIB PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW para. 533c, at 254-57 (3d ed. 2007).
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economic reality expressed in terms of ability to control prices or eliminate
competitors because it creates too narrow a market, therefore increasing the
probability of false positives. However, given the fact that many
commentators and most regulators seem to differentiate between large,
medium, and small banks, there is a conception in the trade that bank size
somehow correlates to the economic reality of bank markets.154
ii. Geographic Market
"Geographic-market area" is defined as the area where a hypothetical
monopolist could effectively control prices. 5 5 In the financial-services sector,
the Supreme Court last defined the geographic market in a 1970 bank-merger
case, which applied the Philadelphia National Bank case.156 Since then, the
geographic market has greatly changed because of the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.' In the past, the Supreme
Court held that banking was local in nature:
The proper question to be asked in this case is not where the
parties . . . do business or even where they compete, but where,
within the area of competitive overlap, the effect . . . on competition
will be direct and immediate. . . . This depends upon "the
geographic structure of supplier-customer relations." . . . The factor
of inconvenience localizes banking competition as effectively as high
transportation costs in other industries.
154. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 165, 203-204, 124
Stat. at 1450-56 (establishing separate prudential standards for nonbank financial companies,
nonbank holding companies supervised by a board of directors, and bank holding companies with
assets of $500 billion or more); Michael W. Boyer, Student Article, Financial Regulatory
Reform: A New Foundation or More of the Same?, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 233, 245 (2009)
(discussing the different performances between large banks and small and medium banks in the
early 2000s); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-281, BANK FEES: FEDERAL
BANKING REGULATORS COULD BETTER ENSURE THAT CONSUMERS HAVE REQUIRED
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO OPENING CHECKING OR SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 12, 16-17, 45
(2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08281 .pdf [hereinafter BANK FEES] (analyzing the
banking system based on the size of the bank, noting differences in consumers' costs between
larger and smaller banks, and defining an institution's size based on assets).
155. Tim McCarthy, Refining Product Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis ofBank
Mergers, 46 DUKE L.J. 865, 867-68 (1997).
156. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 362-65 (1970); see
also United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-59 (1963).
157. See Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.); Survey of 1995 Alabama Legislation, 47 ALA. L. REV. 645, 648 (1996) (explaining
that the Riegle-Neal Act allows mergers between banks in different states, which essentially
preempts state law on such a merger, and noting that the Act authorizes national banks to
establish branches in states that expressly permit out-of-state banks to establish branches within
the states' boarders).
158. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356-59 (quoting CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 102 (1959)).
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Although this observation may reflect the economic reality of the time,
much has changed in banking since the 1960s. Today, banking is national in
nature and, in some instances, international. Electronic banking reduced the
necessity of a local bank for many, and commercial banking has expanded into
previously forbidden areas of investment banking and insurance. 159
Accordingly, the Court's analysis in Philidelphia National Bank of the
geographic market for banking is inapplicable today, especially regarding
systemic financial-service institutions, which reach throughout the nation and,
in some cases, the world.160
Fortunately, the Supreme Court recognized that precedent does not require
courts to be "blind . . . to economic realities."1 61 In the case of systemic
financial-service institutions, the national market reflects the reality of how
they build and conduct their business.162 These institutions engage in national
plannin , are regulated on a national level, and conduct activities in many
states. Though one could argue that, under this construct, the geographic
market should be the world because systemic financial-services institutions
conduct their business on a global basis, such a conclusion depends on the
particular institution. Most domestic systemic financial-service institutions
have a majority of their assets in domestic, not international, sources.164
Because the domestic GDP serves as the target for a systemic
financial-services institution's achievement of a negative externality of public
159. See Kagan et al., Does Internet Banking Affect the Performance of Community Banks?,
AGECON SEARCH (Oct. 10, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bit
stream/19246/1/sp05kaO3.pdf (discussing how advancements in technology have made
community banks less relevant and have opened the banking industry to national and international
market levels); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 102-103, 113 Stat.
1338, 1341-51 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (opening up the market by
allowing investment banks, commercial banks, and insurance companies to consolidate when they
previously were unable).
160. Carl Felsenfeld, Panel Discussion I: Development of Bank Mergers Law, 13 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 511, 527 (2008) (claiming that consolidation in national banking and continued
changes in banking services allow for altering market definitions and participants); Edward
Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia National Bank
Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 637-46 (2008) (advocating for the modernization
of the geographic area in antitrust analysis to expand such beyond the local scope of the Supreme
Court's decision in Philadelphia National Bank).
161. United States v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 662 (1974).
162. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966).
163. See id (noting that the geographic area of the entity at issue was national and that it
engaged in "national planning"); Felsenfeld, supra note 160, at 526-27 (discussing the large and
expanding geographic market for many business); Pekarek & Huth, supra note 160, at 631-36
(discussing how financial services are no longer confined to a determinate industry).
164. FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL
BANKS THAT HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY
CONSOLIDATED ASSETS, FED. RESERVE (JUNE 30, 2010), www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/br/current/default.htm.
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insurance against risk, the national market is a more likely "economic reality"
than an international market.
However, the expansion of the geographic market from a local to a national
one dilutes monopoly power.s As the borders of the geographic market
expand, so do the potential market participants, which reduces market power
under a market-share analysis. This reduction, coupled with the
aforementioned struggle to define the product market, suggests that a systemic
financial-service institution would not be found to possess monopoly power
under the traditional market-share analysis. Rather, a new approach is required
to establish the monopoly power of a systemic financial-service institution.
C. Negative Externalities and Monopoly Power
Given the less-than-optimal application and result of a market-share
approach to monopoly power, an alternative method focusing on negative
externalities is desirable and feasible under the current law concerning § 2 of
the Sherman Act. This Article proposes that systemic financial-service
institutions possess monopoly power by virtue of their systemic nature.166
Though the analysis may depend upon the industry, systemic financial-service
institutions can, and have, controlled prices and eliminated competitors.167
1. The First Prong of§ 2 of the Sherman Act: Possessing Monopoly Power
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements.' 68  The first is "the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market."16 9 Before delving into
monopoly power, it is necessary to explore externalities generally.
Externalities may be positive or negative. A positive externality occurs when
165. Felsenfeld, supra note 160, at 527 (discussing how redefining a global market creates
levels of commercial-bank concentration that would fall below that which antitrust laws are
aimed to prevent).
166. Whether all systemic institutions possess monopoly power is beyond the scope of this
Article.
167. THOMAS M. HOENIG, LEVERAGE AND DEBT: THE IMPACT OF TODAY'S CHOICES ON
TOMORROw (2009), available at www.kansascityfed.org/speechbio/hoenigPDF/hoenig
KBA.08.06.09.pdf (commenting on the concentration in the banking industry); see Cho, supra
note 151, at A19 (discussing methods used by community banks to better compete with larger
institutions, such as increased personalized services); Andrew Martin & Ron Lieber, Overdraft
Open Season, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2010, at B (noting that large banks were preparing an
advertisement campaign to convince consumers to sign up for overdraft services after federal
regulations prohibited banks from charging overdraft fees without the consent of the consumer);
Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ww.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html
(last updated Feb. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Failed Bank List].
168. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966); see also Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.").
169. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570.
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the acts of one person bestow a benefit on another.170 A negative externality
occurs when the acts of one person impose a cost on another.171  Negative
externalities that are not internalized through legislation or regulation create a
Pareto-imperfect market, reducing the costs to the producer and increasing the
costs to others. 172  The cost reduction does not necessarily result in cost
savings to consumers, although it may.173 When a firm has significant cost
savings through externalities and its competitors do not, the firm enjoying the
benefit of the negative externalities is able to control prices with a smaller
market share. 174
Systemic financial-service institutions benefit from the negative externality
of public insurance against risk.'75  This insurance is in the form of
government intervention through bailouts, aimed at preventing the systemic
financial service institution from failing. With such insurance, the cost of
which the public bears, systemic financial-service institutions are free to take
high risks with corresponding higher profits and can avoid the traditional
free-market punishment for taking unreasonable risks.176 Firms that can
externalize costs have an unfair advantage over firms that cannot.177
Specifically, a systemic financial-service institution can take greater risks,
which results in higher profits and an enhanced ability to control prices with a
smaller market share than courts normally required in antitrust litigation.
Additionally, the power to exclude competitors is often tied to the excluding
firm's ability to raise its rivals' costS. 1 79 As the global financial crisis of 2008
170. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1432 n. 115 (1996).
171. Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and
Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 8 (2005).
172. Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Private Choices and Public Law: Richard A.
Posner's Contributions to Family Law and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 403, 417
(2001).
173. See id
174. See Thomas A. Lambert & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust (Over-?) Confidence, 20 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 219, 221 (2008) (arguing that antitrust law should consider externalities);
Steven J. Pilloff, Does the Presence ofBig Banks Influence Competition in Local Markets?, 15 J.
FIN. SERVS. RESEARCH 159, 161 (1999) (stating that big banks have more influence on
competition than their market share would suggest).
175. Cho, supra note 151 (explaining that big banks engage in unreasonably risky behavior
because they know that the public will bail them out).
176. See id.; de Bandt & Hartmann, supra note 64, at 17 (discussing public and private safety
nets that ultimately bear the risk of moral hazard when financial institutions fail).
177. Lambert & Wright, supra note 174, at 221.
178. See BANK FEES, supra note 154, at 16 (discussing how, overall, large institutions charge
more than medium and small institutions for overdraft fees); Pilloff, supra note 174, at 161
(noting that "deep pockets" permit big banks to "engage in predatory or disciplinary pricing
behavior in a particular market," which has an impact on smaller competitors that do not have the
same resources).
179. Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law,
76 GEO. L.J. 241, 249 (1987).
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has demonstrated, systemic financial-service institutions have the ability to
extort government aid, which reduces the costs of their poor judgment, but
relatively increases the costs to their competitors.180 Empirical evidence has
established that this dynamic has the effect of eliminating competitors; 140
FDIC nonsystemic financial-services institutions failed in 2009.1 During the
same time period, the government bailed out systemic financial-service
institutions with public funds.182 These institutions were then allowed to buy
other failing institutions with the public-bailout money, which served to
compound the problem. 18 3  The ability of systemic financial-service
institutions to eliminate competitors, coupled with the ability to control prices,
is indicative of monopoly power.
2. The Willful Acquisition or Maintenance of Monopoly Power: Conduct
Prong
The second prong of a Sherman §2 analysis is "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident."1 84 "Simply possessing monopoly power" is not enough. 185
The Supreme Court has interpreted antitrust law narrowly to safeguard "risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth."1 86  The conduct
examined in this Article is the intentional quest of systemic financial-service
institutions to become systemic in order to increase the likelihood of a
government bailout if excessive risk taking results in a financial crisis. To
date, no cases indicate that such conduct is or is not "willful acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power" as required by the Sherman Act, but the
underlying antitrust premise of efficiency supports the proposition that such
conduct is anticompetitive.18 7
The type of conduct indicative of "willful acquisition or maintenance" has
variously been described as "exclusionary,"18 8  "predatory,"' 89  and
180. Cho, supra note 151, at A19 (revealing that, after the bailout, large banks had a 0.34%
interest rate advantage over small banks, up from a 0.08% advantage in 2009, and that large
banks raised their deposit fees 8%, while small banks had to lower their fees 12% to be
competitive).
181. Failed Bank List, supra note 167.
182. Cho, supra note 151, at A19.
183. Id.
184. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
185. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009).
186. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
187. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985)
(noting that unlawful monopolist behavior is not based in efficiency).
188. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 1120; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993); Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602-03.
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"anticompetitive."190  Specifically, it is "behavior that not only (1) tends to
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further
competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way."' 91 A
firm does not further competition on the merits when its actions are predicated
on some basis other than efficiency.192
Examples of the type of conduct that have met these requirements in the past
include "below-cost prices that drive rivals out of the market and allow the
monopolist to raise its prices later and recoup its losses";193 "limited
circumstances in which a firm's unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can
give rise to antitrust liability";194 tying arrangements where a firm requires a
customer to purchase a tied product in order to purchase the tying product;195
fraudulent patent procurement;196 acquisition of competitors;19 and restrictive
agreements. 198 These examples are illustrative and do not create an exhaustive
list; rather, industries employ a myriad of anticompetitive conduct. 199
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not found illicit conduct when
facts indicated price cuts that were not below costs and were used by the
company merely to increase business.200 Further, in price-cutting cases, the
Court has expressed concern regarding overzealous antitrust enforcement that
could chill competition 201 and harm consumers who benefit from the lower
189. Brooke Group, 509 U.S., at 222-24; Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328, 340 (1990); Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602.
190. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602.
191. Id at 604 (quoting 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, § 651b, at 76-77).
192. See id at 602-03 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 160 (1978)) (noting
that anticompetitive behavior and improper exclusion is intended to create a monopoly).
193. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 129 S. Ct. at 1118 (citing Brooke Group, Ltd., 509 U.S. at 222-24).
194. Id. (citing Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608-11).
195. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992)
(holding that the issue of whether Kodak engaged in monopolistic behavior when it limited
private-service companies' access to replacement parts turned on whether Kodak had valid
business justifications for its activity).
196. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78
(1965) (concerning allegations that a company misrepresented facts in an attempt to gain a
patent).
197. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911) (discussing whether a
monopoly existed as a result of corporate combinations and stock transfers).
198. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (considering restrictive
agreements that preempted competition as a factor in determining whether a monopoly existed).
199. Verizon Commn'cs, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
200. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)
(discussing how cutting prices is a common way to increase business and is at the core of
competition).
201. See id ("[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a
particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price
competition." (quoting Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir.
1983) (internal citation marks omitted))); see also Brooke Groupe Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
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prices. 2 0 2  Additionally, the Court has been reluctant to find monopolistic
conduct in cases where a firm refused to deal with its rivals, finding instead
that, as a general rule, firms are free to deal with whomever they please. 203
Finally, the Court has allowed tying arrangements where there is economic
efficiency in selling products as a package. To summarize, courts will not
"act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms
of dealing."205 They will, however, intercede when the conduct is predicated
on an economically meritless attempt to usurp control of a market. 206
Evidence suggests that systemic financial-service institutions actively seek
systemic status in order to obtain a government bailout if their risk taking
proves to be in poor judgment.207 Upon achieving this status, a systemic
financial-service institution can leverage at a higher ratio and take greater
risks, resulting in higher profits than their nonsystemic competitors because
they are not faced with the economic downside to such risks, namely
bankruptcy.208 In a free market, innovation and risk taking is tempered by the
reality of bankruptcy, creating a balanced, vibrant, rational market rather than a
chaotic, irrational market.
The overarching question is: is deliberately becoming systemic efficient?
The Supreme Court has equated efficiency with the theoretical possibility of
209
pro-competitive effects. Perhaps some economists would argue the
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S.
104, 121 n.17 (1986)) (referencing the chilling effect that mistaking price cuts to increase
business for predatory pricing may have on competition).
202. Atil. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990) (stating that low
prices benefit customers and, as long as they are not predatory, do not threaten competition).
203. Pa. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) (citing
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). But see Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 540
U.S. at 409 ("The unilateral termination ofa voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of
dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.").
204. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-12 (1984), superseded by
statute on other grounds, Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006)), as recognized in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
205. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 408.
206. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1988)
(upholding a verdict for the plaintiff where evidence supported an inference that the defendant
was not motivated by efficiency and was willing to sacrifice profits in order to push out the
competitor).
207. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 202-04 (asserting that private institutions will
seek to hold wider economic interests hostage to increase their chances of bailout).
208. Id at 193.
209. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-94 (2007)
(citing authorities noting instances of businesses that use resale price management for purposes of
efficiency and not to gain or establish a monopoly).
[Vol. 60:357386
Systemic Financial-Service Institutions and Power
efficiencies of systemic financial-service institutions, but, to date, most argue
the opposite.210
Economies of scale could be efficient for antitrust purposes,211 as could
212 213marketing and distribution efficiencies. But all of these "efficiencies"
seem to be premised on a theory of free enterprise-a free market theory that
aims to minimize government intervention.214  In contrast, systemic
financial-service institutions seek government intervention through bailouts, a
contradiction of the free-market theory. 215 Because antitrust enforcement is
also government intervention, the ultimate question becomes: which form of
government intervention is more efficient-bailouts or antitrust enforcement?
In balancing efficiencies between bailouts and antitrust enforcement, Judge
Learned Hand's negligence formula is instructive. Negligence exists if the
burden of preventing a harm (B) is less than the probability that an actor's
conduct will result in injury (P), multiplied by the gravity of that injury (L);
216
accordingly, negligence exists if B < PL. As applied to financial reform,
efficiency exists if the burden of eliminating a systemic financial-service
institution (B) is less than the probability (P) of systemic financial failure (L).
It follows that, even if the probability of systemic financial failure can be
lowered by managing systemic financial-service institutions, the harm may
remain unacceptable relative to the burden of eliminating systemic
financial-service institutions through divestiture. In other words, a systemic
financial-service institution may be so risky, eliminating-rather than
managing-it may be prudent.
210. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 211-13 (arguing that there is no empirical
evidence to support the conclusion that big banks are efficient and that much of what big-bank
proponents note to be efficiencies can be achieved by smaller financial institutions); POSNER, A
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at 128-29 (arguing that the efficiency of big banks
borrowing short term and lending long term actually creates instability in financial institutions,
and, though perhaps less immediately profitable, long-term borrowing is more economically
beneficial); Boyer, supra note 154, at 245 (arguing that, despite all the business reforms, such as
cutting services at branches to increase online banking, large banks did not perform as well as
smaller banks).
211. FTC v. Procter Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 588 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 74, at 200 (1977).
212. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977) ("Marketing
efficiency is not the only legitimate reason for a manufacturer's desire to exert control over the
manner in which his products are sold and received.").
213. See id at 54-56 (discussing the efficiency and general practice of product distribution).
214. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 464 (10th ed. 1997) (defining
"free enterprise" as "freedom of private business to organize and operate for profit in a
competitive system without interference by government beyond regulation necessary to protect
public interest and keep the national economy in balance").
215. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 193 (theorizing that megabanks take greater
risks because they know the government will intervene to prevent a major market failure).
216. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Aspects of
Judge Hand's formula are represented in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 (1965).
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IV. ANTITRUST AND IMPLIED IMMUNITY IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES
In certain arenas, such as the insurance industry, Congress provides express
immunity from antitrust laws.217  In other regulated industries, Congress
expressly preserves antitrust enforcement.218 But, when legislation is silent on
the immunity issue or merely provides a general savings clause, the courts
have to consider the issue of implied immunity.219 Until recently, the
possibility of implied immunity from antitrust laws for regulated industries
was of little concern.220 The Supreme Court stated the following in Gordon v.
New York Stock Exchange, a case involving securities law: "Repeal of the
antitrust laws by implication is not favored and not casually to be allowed.
Only where there is a 'plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory
provisions' will repeal be implied." 221
However, the Court relaxed the "plain repugnancy" standard in the more
recent decision of Credit Suisse Securities (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing.222
In Credit Suisse, the Court again addressed the issue of implied antitrust
immunity in the context of securities law.223 The Securities Act of 1933 had a
general savings clause, 224 but no clause expressly saving antitrust law.225 The
Court, using an implied immunity analysis, applied a four-part test:
(1) an area of conduct squarely within the heartland of securities
regulations; (2) clear and adequate SEC authority to regulate; (3)
active and ongoing agency regulation; and (4) a serious conflict
between the antitrust and regulatory regimes. We therefore conclude
that the securities laws are "clearly incompatible" with the
application of the antitrust laws in this context.226
Some suggest that the change in language from Gordon's "plain
repugnancy" test to Credit Suisse's "clearly incompatible" test reflects a
broader approach by the Court regarding implied immunity, permitting an
expanding application of antitrust immunity in cases involving securities
217. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006).
218. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398,
406-07 (2004) (noting that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 "preserves claims that satisfy
existing antitrust standards").
219. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 271 (2007).
220. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682-83 (1975) (discussing a line of
Supreme Court opinions recognizing that antitrust immunity is granted in very limited
circumstances).
221. Id. at 682 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963)).
222. 551 U.S. at 275-76.
223. See id at 267-68.
224. 15 U.S.C § 77p(a) (2006).
225. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C., 551 U.S. at 288 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 285 (majority opinion).
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laws.227 After this, it remains to be answered whether the Court would extend
the Credit Suisse test to banking law.
It is possible that banking law would continue to be governed by the "plain
repugnancy" standard the Court set forth in Philadelphia National Bank:
"[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are
strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions."228 However, this would lead
to the application of different standards depending on the regulated industry in
question-implied immunity on the basis of a "clearly incompatible" test
would be applied in securities law, and implied immunity on the basis of "plain
repugnancy" would be applied in the banking sector. 2 29  The "plain
repugnancy" test is easy to apply and rather predictable; if the industry is
230
regulated, implied immunity from antitrust law will still be disfavored.
Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, courts will apply the more expansive
"clearly incompatible" implied-immunity test-that is, the test more likely to
find implied immunity-to all regulated industries.231 However, because it has
become apparent that the lack of regulatory oversight significantly contributed
to the current financial crisis,232 specifically given recent public disclosures
about the Securities and Exchange Commission's lack of oversight,233 courts
should, at the very least, critically review the application of the second and
third prongs of the Credit Suisse test: "(2) clear and adequate [regulatory
227. See Stacey Sheely Chubbuck, Note, Securities Law and Antitrust Law: Two Legal
Titans Clash Before the United States Supreme Court in Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, 62
OKLA. L. REv. 145, 164-65 (2009) (arguing that, as a result of the more expansive Credit Suisse
holding, "implied immunity could extend to any activity ruled to be within the 'heartland' of
securities regulations").
228. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
229. See Justin Lacour, Note, Unclear Repugnancy: Antitrust Immunity in Securities Markets
After Credit Suisse Securities (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1115, 1117-21
(2008) (arguing that, as a result of the Court's new approach to implied immunity in Credit
Suisse, there is no clear standard, which could lead to different results).
230. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-51.
231. See Bruce H. Schneider, Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing and a Case for Antitrust
Immunity for Mortgage Lenders Subject to Federal Regulation, 124 BANKING L.J. 833, 833,
840-41 (2007) (arguing that the Credit Suisse approach is applicable to other industries and
finding it likely that mortgage lenders have implied antitrust immunity because that industry is
heavily regulated).
232. See POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at 46 (describing the banking
industry as "largely unregulated," a factor that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis).
233. James Gordon Meek, SEC Porn Scandal: Political Payback for Fraud Suit Against
Goldman Sachs?, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.dailynews.com/
news/national/2010/04/24/2010-04-24_secpornproblejust payback.html (implying that the
SEC pornography scandal reemerged in the public eye as a result of the SEC's decision to pursue
a fraud suit against Goldman Sachs); Ed O'Keefe, SEC Porn Scandal Results in Zero Firings,
Agency Said, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2010, 8:37 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-
eye/2010/04/new secporn bust details rele_1.html (revealing that several SEC employees used
work time to view pornography instead of overseeing the securities industry).
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agency] authority to regulate [and] (3) active and ongoing agency
regulation."234
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has an
235
antitrust-specific savings clause, thus a court could not find implied
immunity. 36 Systemic financial-service institutions that fall under the
provisions of this Act would, therefore, not be entitled to express or implied
immunity.237 That said, the Supreme Court held that in regulated industries,
where the regulatory structure is designed to address anticompetitive harm, the
benefits of applying antitrust law will be small, even when Congress has
expressly preserved the application of antitrust laws.238 A discussion of the
issues associated with this quasi-implied immunity follows.
V. PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING SHERMAN §2 TO SYSTEMIC
FINANCIAL-SERVICE INSTITUTIONS
There are several problems with applying § 2 of the Sherman Act to
systemic financial-service institutions. First, there is the general issue of
whether § 2 is applicable to systemic financial-service institutions.239 As
discussed in Parts II and IV, § 2 a plies to these institutions, 2 4 0 though there
are certainly those who disagree.2 Regardless, there are many remaining
problems, including quasi-implied immunity, cyclical government
enforcement, a lack of judicial understanding of the economic theories
underlying antitrust law and the financial services sector, the expense of
litigation in antitrust cases, the additional social burdens to the economy if an
action has a negative impact on the economy, and the burden created if the
government requires systemic financial-service institutions to divest and thus
become too small to compete against unregulated foreign systemic
financial-service institutions.
234. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007).
235. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 6, 124 Stat. 1376, 1390-91 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5303).
236. Cf Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398,
406 (2004) (finding that the antitrust-specific savings clause of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 barred a finding of implied immunity).
237. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 6, 124 Stat. at
1390-91.
238. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 412.
239. See supra Parts lI-III.
240. See supra Parts Il-Ill.
241. See Rosch, surpa note 71, at 8-9 (acknowledging the debate about whether antitrust law
should apply to "too big to fail" institutions); see also Lawrence J. White, Financial Regulation
and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the Antitrust Community 39-40 (June I1, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1426188 (arguing that size is an issue for
many "too big to fail" institutions, and therefore antitrust issues, which concern market power,
generally do not apply).
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A. Quasi-Implied Immunity
When the courts deal with a regulated industry in an antitrust case, there is a
reluctance to intervene, especially if the courts are asked to expand application
of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court recognized in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, L.L.P. that, generally,
when deciding antitrust cases, the Court considers the level of federal and state
regulation of the industry, the "distinctive economic and legal setting of the
regulated industry," and whether the regulatory structure is designed to "deter
and remedy anticompetitive harm." 242 In particular, the Court noted that,
where such a regulatory structure exists, "the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less
plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny."243 Such
a regulatory context is probative of implied immunity, but "it may also be a
consideration in deciding whether to recognize an expansion of the contours of
§ 2."244 Of course, the simple answer to the Court's reservation about
intervening in such circumstances is that Congress, not the judiciary, should
decide if there is to be antitrust immunity. This is particularly true in cases
where the applicable statute has a specific antitrust savings clause.
More problematic is the question of what courts should do when faced with
a regulatory structure that is ostensibly designed to deter and remedy
anticompetitive harm but that is, in fact, impotent due to certain regulatory
issues, such as regulatory capture, relatory cycles, regulatory arbitrage, or
dysfunctional regulatory oversight. When such factors are present, the
benefit of antitrust enforcement may be extensive, and the application of
antitrust quasi-immunity would undermine competition and the free market.
Indeed, it seems Congress anticipated these regulatory problems in legislation
246
where it incorporated an antitrust-specific savings clause.
B. Cyclical Government Enforcement
Antitrust actions brought by the government, specifically by the Department
of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, are sporadic at best. Data on § 2
of the Sherman Act reveals a paucity of § 2 actions:
242. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 540 U.S. 411-12.
243. Id. at 412.
244. Id
245. See supra Part VII.
246. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 6, 124 Stat. 1376, 1390-91 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1503).
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Table 1. DOJ Investigations 2 4 7
TOTAL
INVESTIGATIONS
INITIATED 2000 2001 2002 2003 20041200512006 2007 200812009
Sherman §2 10 10 13 11 7 8 3 6 0 7
Monopoly
Table 2. DOJ District Court Antitrust Cases 248
CIVIL ACTIONS
REGARDING
SHERMAN ACT § 2 2000 2001 2002 200312004 200512006 2007 2008 2009
Filed 1 0 0 0 0 o0o 0 0 0
Terminated 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0
Won 0 00 0 0 o0 1
Lost 0 0 0 0 1 0 11010 0
Dismissed 0 0 0 l0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Table 3. FTC Non-Merger Enforcement Actions 249
TOTAL
PART 3 NON-MERGER
FISCAL PART 2 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORDER
YEAR CONSENTS INJUNCTIONS COMPLAINTS ACTIONS VIOLATIONS
2010 5 - 2 7 -
247. Antitrust Division Workload Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: ANTITRUST Div.,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
248. Id.
249. FTC Competition Enforcement Database: Nonmerger Enforcement Actions, FED.
TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.govIbc/caselist/nonmerger/index.shtmI (last modified Nov. 30,
2010).
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The data above suggest an unwillingness on the part of government
enforcement agencies to bring monopolization cases. This is further supported
by a lack of commitment from the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division to
investigate monopolization issues relating to systemic financial-service
institutions.250 Antitrust enforcement may be cyclical, depending on factors
such as antitrust legislation and economic productivity;251 currently, the
government appears to be in a period of nonenforcement. But, despite this
problem of cyclical nonenforcement of antitrust laws, § 2 of the Sherman Act
is enforceable through private law suits.252 Private suits may serve to mitigate
periods experiencing a lack of government enforcement.253
250. See Peter Whoriskey, Justice's Monopoly Guidelines Assailed: Majority of FTC Says
Policy Would Weaken Enforcement, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2008, at DI ("The Justice Department
issued a report yesterday establishing how and when it will crack down on misbehaving
monopolies, but its approach was immediately assailed as too lax and the work of an
administration willing to allow big business to run roughshod over consumers.").
251. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1159, 1175-76 (2008)
(providing evidence that antitrust-enforcement cycles are affected by new antitrust legislation and
economic productivity).
252. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
253. But see Lambert & Wright, supra note 174, at 228-30 (discussing the short falls of
private actions concerming § 2 of the Sherman Act).
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C. Lack ofJudicial Understanding of the Economic Theories Underlying
Antitrust Law and the Financial Services Sector
There is some concern that courts do not fully understand the economic
theories underlying antitrust law and other economic theories affecting the
254financial-services sector. This lack of comprehension could produce false
positives-a finding of anticompetitive practices when there are
none-thereby exacerbating the problem. However, antitrust economic theory
does not have a monopoly on this argument, as some also argue that courts do
not understand the technology involved in Internet cases.255 Regardless, courts
continue to address complex legal issues, which is preferable to ignoring the
applicable law because of its overall complexity. Though courts have made,
and will continue to make, mistakes, the legal system in the United States is
designed to remedy these errors through the appellate and legislative
processes.256
D. Litigation in Antitrust Cases is Often Expensive
There is no dispute that antitrust litigation is often expensive.257 As a
practical matter, this expense reduces the number of private antitrust cases and
can have a devastating impact on a business sued for antitrust violations. Even
so, the legal system is not without tools to mitigate some of the expense.
254. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252-54 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(analyzing the inherent dangers and confusion that arise when courts take on advanced economic
theory); United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972) ("[C]ourts are of
limited utility in examining difficult economic problems."); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Toward a
Dynamic Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Market Behavior, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 101, 113
(2003) (arguing that most courts are hesitant to apply Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc. because "judges do not understand the likelihood of harm to consumers that can result
from aftermarket strategies"); Lisa C. Wood, Court-Appointed Independent Experts: A Litigator's
Critique, ANTITRUST, Spring 2007, at 91, 92 (noting that the need for court-appointed experts is
driven by many judges' inability to understand complex economic issues arising in antitrust law).
255. See LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through
Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring
2002, at 1, 1-3 (2002), available at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/01_0203
09_Kondo.pdf ("[T]he judicial system has been perplexed in the face of the extraordinary and
unique complexities introduced by novel technologies and scientific breakthroughs.").
256. Makan Delrahim, Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Challenge
of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 343, 357
(2005) (recognizing that the American legal system is designed to learn from mistakes and adapt
to better handle complex technological and economic issues in the future).
257. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (acknowledging the
expense of antitrust litigation); S. Austin Coalition Community v. SBC Commc'ns. Inc., 274 F.3d
1168, 1171 (7th. Cir. 2001) (noting the expense of antitrust litigation); see also Thomas C.
Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1163,
1211 (1988) (noting "Judge [Frank H.] Easterbrook's concern that courts cannot accurately,
consistently, and inexpensively apply their preferred economic theories" regarding antitrust law
(emphasis added)).
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Although discovery has been cited as the main expense in antitrust
litigation, courts have the power to limit discovery259 and assess sanctions
for frivolous-discovery tactics.260 Likewise, courts have significant authority
to reduce some of the expenses associated with antitrust litigation by setting
discovery and motion cut-off deadlines and the trial date.
2 6 1
E. The Additional Social Burdens to the Economy ifAntitrust Actions Have a
Negative Economic Effect
There is concern that antitrust enforcement will worsen the economic
crisis.262 This is particularly prevalent with regard to the divestiture of
systemic financial-service institutions as some government officials advocate
that maintaining systemic financial-service institutions is in the best interest of
the economy. Breaking up big banks through antitrust law may possibly
258. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558-59 (2007) (citing several sources that emphasize the
high cost of discovery in antitrust litigation).
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
260. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
261. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referencing various
federal rules of civil procedure that authorize the courts to control pretrial proceedings). But see
id. at 560 n.6 (majority opinion) (indicating the probability of ineffective judicial supervision and
the importance of discovery in establishing the relevant facts of the case).
262. See John D. Harkrider, Lessons from the Great Depression, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at
6, 9-10 (identifying a tendency to relax antitrust enforcement during economic crises and arguing
that antitrust enforcement must be more vigilant in hard times); Jim Wilson, From the Section
Chair, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009. at 3, 3 (citing Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.
for Econ., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Competition as Public Policy, Remarks at the
ABA Antitrust Symposium (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/245857.htm (noting the need to continue to protect the principles of
competition even in tough economic times).
263. Zach Carter, Larry Summers Is Lying About Big Banks, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26,
2010, 10:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zach-carter/larr-summers-is-lying-
ab b 551699.html (criticizing as wrong a statement President Obama's top economic adviser,
Larry Summers, made stating that breaking up the big banks would jeopardize today's economy);
Simon Johnson, The Consensus on Big Banks Shifts, But Not at Treasury, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 30, 2010, 8:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-johnson/the-consensus-on-big-
bank b 594980.html (reporting that international bodies and foreign governments are shifting to
the view that large banks are too dangerous and need to be split up, though the U.S. government's
position supporting large banks has not changed); see Geithner: Banks with "Privilege " of
Borrowing from U.S. Must Limit Risk, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 10, 2010),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-junel0/banks_01-21.html (indicating the
government's unwillingness to state that big banks need to be broken up); Summers: Bank
Reforms Would Halt "Too Big to Fail" Mentality, PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june2010/summers_04-22.html (explaining that breaking up
big banks could lead to the failure of many small institutions, which would require more bailouts
and reliance on taxpayers).
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reap economic havoc;264 however merely managing systemic financial-service
institutions may prolong the recession, result in repeat cataclysmic cycles, or
create a need for more bailouts.265 The bottom line is that economists do not
know what will happen, no matter which road the government takes.266
However, history teaches something about antitrust enforcement in an
economic crisis: that the path to economic recovery in fact may be the
less-traveled path of antitrust enforcement.
Significant evidence exists that supports the observation that, during the
Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration initially tried to protect big
267business with the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). The premise
was that centralized planning with "codes of fair competition" would set
prices, wapes, and production quotas, and would restrict entry into the various
markets.26 Competition principles were set aside under the industry-advanced
theory that too much competition was bad for the economy.269 The experiment
270failed, and the economy continued its malaise. In 1937, after the Supreme
Court declared major components of the NIRA unconstitutional, 271 Roosevelt
changed tactics when he unleashed the antitrust kraken. 272 Some attribute the
vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws from 1937 to 1943 as the reason the
264. Summers: Bank Reforms Would Halt "Too Big to Fail" Mentality, supra note 263
(noting that some observers believe breaking up big banks would make the country less stable and
would put banks "at greater risk of failing").
265. See Simon Johnson, Richard Fisher, Senior Fed Official: White House Is Dead Wrong,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2010, 9:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-
johnson/richard-fisher-senior-fed b 602386.htm ("[R]elying on regulation alone is unwise and
most definitely the triumph of hope over experience.").
266. See Systemic Risk: Are Some Institutions Too Big to Fail and If So, What Should We Do
About It?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5-15 (2009) (showing
conflicting testimony regarding financial reform).
267. David J. Saylor, Recent Federal Antitrust and DOJ/FTC Law Enforcement
Developments that May Affect Communications Policy, Including Bundling of Video
Programming Channels in Tiers, Single Firm Conduct (Including Conduct Involving Essential
Facilities), and Media, Telecoms, and Broadband-Related Mergers, in BROADBAND AND CABLE
INDUSTRY LAW 613, 676-77 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 22634, 2010), WL 994 PLI/Pat 613 (noting that, at the beginning of the
Great Depression, legislation was passed that "effectively foreclosed competition").
268. Id. at 677.
269. See id.
270. Id ("These codes of fair competition .... resulted in restricted output, higher prices,
and reduced consumer purchasing power.").
271. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
272. Saylor, supra note 267, at 677 (noting the increase in antitrust enforcement from 1937 to
1939); see also Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Throught: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 325, 379 (1995)
(indicating that the elimination of the NIRA's ability to permit group empowerment and control
after the Supreme Court declared that delegation of sovereign power to private groups was
unconstitutional); Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 569, 573 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's declaration that the NIRA was
unconstitutional in 1935).
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United States pulled out of the Great Depression.273 This attribution goes too
far, however, because it is likely that many other factors contributed to the
economic turnaround. Still, it appears that enforcement of antitrust laws
during an economic crisis helped, rather than harmed, the economy.274
True, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the economic impact of a
false positive,275 but, to date, courts have not refused to apply antitrust laws
based solely on a fear of a possible negative economic impact.276 Indeed, the
Court has specifically rejected the argument of violating antitrust laws for a
perceived economic good:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it
can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be
foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain
private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might
promote greater competition in a more important sector of the
economy.
Accordingly, the application of antitrust principles in an economic crisis
warrants fair consideration.
F. Too Small to Compete with Foreign Systemic Financial-Service Institutions
A major factor contributing to the deregulation of the financial-services
278
sector was concern about foreign competition. This concern continues to
273. Saylor, supra note 267, at 676-78 (noting that strict antitrust enforcement from 1938 to
1943 was "a cornerstone of the New Deal's economic agenda and a part of that era's legacy for
modem economic policy").
274. See Kamp, supra note 272, at 382 (indicating that shortly after President Roosevelt
abandoned the idea of a business commonwealth and "flirted with Keynesianism and a vigorous
antitrust program," the Depression era ended); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping
of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (referencing the importance of antitrust principles
during the second New Deal); Saylor, supra note 267, at 676-78 (indicating the importance of
"vigorous antitrust enforcement"); Waller, supra note 272, at 588-94 (exploring several antitrust
cases that were brought against large and small industries during the depression, each strictly
applying antitrust policy); Harkrider, supra note 262, at 9-10 (opining that antitrust enforcement
is more important in bad economic times than in good).
275. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) ("The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.").
276. See id at 414-15 (explaining the difficulty of evaluating the allegations of antitrust
violations without the problem of "false positives").
277. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
278. See H. JOURNAL, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 2788 (1998) (summarizing legislation aimed to
"enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for
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arise in legislation aimed at reregulating the financial-services sector.2 7 9
Simply put, the problematic issue is: would it be wise economic policy to
break up U.S. systemic financial-service institutions when foreign competitors
are not similarly constrained? 280
As a policy matter, a balance should be considered with regard to foreign
competition. Foreign systemic financial-service institutions may have a
competitive advantage over domestic nonsystemic financial-service institutions
in the short term. However, it could be argued that such advantage is nothing
more than a government subsidy that could be addressed under international
law through the World Trade Organization.281 As for the long term, the
benefits of eliminating systemic financial-service institutions in the United
States far outweigh the consequences of short-term detriments resulting from
temporary foreign competitive-advantages. One benefit is the preservation of
economic freedom in a free-enterprise system, which is guarded by antitrust
law.
VI. REREGULATION TO MANAGE SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL-SERVICE
INSTITUTIONS
The United States has experienced regulatory problems in the recent and
remote past, and there is no reason to believe that, over time, these problems
will not arise again. As William Faulkner said: "The past is never dead. It's
not even past."2 Granted, there is ongoing discussion regarding how to avoid
these pitfalls, but current proposals inadequately address the fact that some of
the affiliation of banks, securities firms, and other financial service providers, and for other
purposes"); Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, An International Perspective on Domestic Banking
Reform: Could the European Union's Second Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the US.
Regulates Its Own Financial Service Industry, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1715, 1717-18 (1999)
(suggesting that the globalization of the banking industry may place the American domestic
banking-system at a disadvantage); Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers Testimony Before the Joint Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (June
21, 2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/s722.aspx
("While the current framework here in the U.S. remains outdated, markets overseas are
developing in a legal and regulatory environment that allows greater efficiency and
transparency.").
279. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 173, 124 Stat. 1376, 1440 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3105 and 15 U.S.C. § 780).
280. For a discussion of United States antitrust issues with regard to the international arena,
see generally Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail-Too Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should Be
Addressed Through Antitrust Law but Such a Solution Will Only Work If It Is Applied on an
International Basis, 22 FLA. J. INT'L L. 31 (2010).
281. JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 218.
282. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
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these problems, such as regulatory arbitrage, are increasing.283 As such, the
idea that domestic regulation can correct this problem requires a leap of faith.
Although much may be achieved through regulation, it is hubris to believe
that regulatory reform alone will solve the current problems. Solutions to the
problems of regulatory capture, regulatory cycles, regulatory arbitrage, and
dysfunctional regulatory oversight have yet to be articulated in financial
regulatory reform legislation. If the financial crisis of 2008 revealed anything,
it is that regulation is subject to dilution with the passage of time and with the
perception that the problems of the past have been fixed.284 Simply put,
reregulation of financial services will not eliminate systemic risk if it does not
eliminate systemic financial-service institutions.285  Accordingly, the country
still faces the probability that bailouts of systemic financial service institutions
will be necessary in the future.286
So as to not rest economic prosperity on a hope and a prayer, systemic risk
should be eliminated. Without systemic financial-service institutions,
free-market principles would prevail because less government intervention
would be required. Of course, "[a]ntitrust enforcement is a form of
government regulation,"287 but it presents a choice between the lesser of the
two evils-either more or less government intervention. Because a complete
absence of government intervention in the market is not an option in the
foreseeable future, as the government will certainly intervene to avoid systemic
financial failure, antitrust law may provide a valuable tool to minimize
government intervention and maximize free markets.
283. Shahien Nasiripour, Fed's Kocherlakota: Financial Reform Bill Can't End Bailouts or
"Too Big to Fail, " HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2010/05/1 0/feds-kocherlakota-finance n 570689.html (referencing federal officials
who admit that the objectives of financial reform cannot solve or prevent a financial crisis).
284. Arguing for the deregulation of the U.S. financial-services sector in 1987, Citicorp
vice-chairman Thomas Theobald "identifie[d] the three alleged checks on corporate misconduct
as a 'very effective' Securities and Exchange Commission, knowledgeable investors and 'very
sophisticated' rating agencies." Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Wandering Along the
Road to Competition and Convergence-The Changing CMRS Roadmap, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
489, 547 n.266 (2004). In the current economic crisis, all three of these "outside checks" have
proven fatally defective.
285. Narayana Kocheriakota, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minn., Taxing Risk, Remarks
at the Economic Club of Minnesota 4 (May 10, 2010), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-events/pres/kocherlakotaspeech 0707 2 01 0.pdf (arguing
that governments cannot risk the collapse of systemic financial-service institutions and will bail
them out no matter how resolved the government is to allow the institutions to fail).
286. Id. at 4, 10.
287. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 578 (1979).
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A. Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture occurs when regulatory agencies are "dominated by the
industries" that they regulate.288 Where there is regulatory capture, "the
regulator acts primarily in the interests of the regulatees." 289  The financial
crisis of 2008 exemplifies the consequences of regulatory capture.290
Unfortunately, nothing in recent financial-regulation legislation addresses this
concern.291 Without such legislation, one way to deter regulatory capture is to
allow private rights of action for the enforcement and interpretation of
regulatory statutes.292 If regulators were not inclined to regulate, private
citizens could seek redress in the courts.
B. Regulatory Cycles
Regulatory enforcement depends on the political climate. Because of this,
strong support for regulations today may merely be waning support
tomorrow. Regulatory oversight simply will not function properly in a
deregulatory environment with insufficient resources, resulting in de facto
deregulation.294 Nothing in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act addresses changing political climate and resultant regulatory
cycles.295 Political philosophies and new economic realities should be allowed
to evolve and adapt to new circumstances. That said, the deregulatory cycle is
288. Economics A-Z, THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/research/economics/
alphabetic.cfm?letter-R (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
289. Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 06/34, 2006).
290. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 92-104, 118, 207.
291. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
292. See R. Preston McAfee & Nicholas A. Vakkur, The Strategic Abuse ofAntitrust Law, I
J. STRATEGIC MGMT. EDUC. 1, 3-4 (2004), available at http://www.mcafee.
cc/Papers/PDF/strategicantitrust.pdf (proposing the use of private claims against firms to deter
antitrust violations). But see William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 263-64 (1985) (noting abuses of the antitrust system,
including abuses by private suits); William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust
Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. & EcON. 405, 412-13 (1985) (questioning private
actions for antitrust enforcement).
293. See POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at 236, 242-43, 248 (tracing
trends of regulation and deregulation in American history); Foster, supra note 280, at 36-50
(discussing the cycle of regulation, deregulation, and reregulation).
294. See Foster, supra note 280, at 41-43 (discussing the "de facto deregulatory cycle" that
existed in the 1980s).
295. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (failing to directly address changes in regulatory cycles due to the
political climate).
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often followed by a negative disruption to the economic system,296 which is
then followed by reregulation. With the current emphasis on reregulation, the
United States may be doomed to repeat this cycle.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage
Regulatory arbitrage is the practice of relocating operations to a state with
less regulatory oversight,297 exploiting regulatory interagency inconsistencies
within a state, 298 or innovating to avoid regulating, such as creating new
instruments not covered by the regulatory net.29 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act vests the Federal Reserve with
regulatory oversight functions and creates additional layers of regulation,
thereby increasing the possibility of regulatory-arbitrage opportunities between
layers.300
D. Dysfunctional Regulatory Oversight
In the ongoing autopsy of the financial crisis of 2008, it is generally
undisputed that regulatory oversight was dysfunctional .30  Regulator
agencies ignored warnings and rubber-stamped requests of the regulated7 2
because they were understaffed3 03 and ill-prepared to provide meaningful
oversight.304 Again, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act does not adequately address this problem.30s Even if regulatory
oversight were adequate, it would be unreasonable to rely on the expectation
296. Karsten R. Gerdrup, Three Episodes of Financial Fragility in Norway Since the 1890s
(Bank for Int'l Settlement, Working Paper No. 142, 2003) (presenting three financial crises in
Norway that represent a deregulatory cycle).
297. Nicholas Dom, The Governance ofSecurities: Ponzi Finance, Regulatory Convergence,
Credit Crunch, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 23, 31 (2010); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives
and the Costs ofRegulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
298. Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early
History ofRegulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 116 (2008).
299. See id at 96-97 (using "put-call parity" as an example of innovation in regulatory
arbitrage).
300. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ Ill, 152, 1011,
1101-1109, 124 Stat. at 1392-94, 1413-14, 1964-65, 2113-29.
301. See POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at 75 (identifying "withering"
regulation as one of the underlying causes of the financial crisis).
302. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108
YALE L.J. 801, 825 (1999) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997)).
303. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2, at 248 (noting that the Bush
administration decreased the size of the Security and Exchange Commission).
304. Id. at 236 (declaring that the government's response to the situation was "late, slow,
indecisive, and poorly articulated").
305. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (failing to directly address the functionality of regulatory agencies).
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that budgets and politics would not cause a repetitive cycle of dysfunction as
they have in the past.306
Antitrust enforcement, which would eliminate systemic
financial-institutions, has the potential to reduce regulatory capture, regulatory
cycles, regulatory arbitrage, and dysfunctional regulatory oversight because it
provides an additional tool for addressing the problem of systemic
financial-service institutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The history and policies of antitrust law-to protect the democratic process
and promote free markets-makes § 2 of the Sherman Act uniquely applicable
to the problems of systemic financial-service institutions. Additionally, the
theory that antitrust law should promote economic efficiency supports applying
§ 2 to systemic financial-service institutions. Further, this Article established
that systemic financial-service institutions have monopoly power and that their
conduct in deliberately seeking systemic status is improper conduct for
antitrust purposes as provided in case law. Finally, there is no express or
implied immunity from antitrust law for systemic financial-service institutions.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
resembles the wings of an ostrich: "[i]t enable[s] [us] to run, though not to
soar."307 As long as there is a mere attempt to manage systemic risk and not,
to the extent possible, eliminate it, economic potential is limited because the
free market is undermined. Although there are problems with applying § 2 of
the Sherman Act to systemic financial-service institutions, any burden
associated with § 2's application is outweighed by the harm of allowing
systemic financial-service institutions to continue to exist.
306. See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 11-13 (predicting the likelihood of another
financial crisis occurring followed by another government bailout).
307. 1 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, John Dryden, THE EDINBURGH REv., Jan. 1828,
reprinted in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY: CRITICAL AND
HISTORICAL ESSAYS 187, 227 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1900).
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